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Informants & Cooperators  
By Daniel Richman∗    
In Bridging the Gap: A Report on Scholarship and Criminal Justice Reform 
(Erik Luna ed., forthcoming 2017) 
 
Abstract: The police have long relied on informants to make critical cases, and 
prosecutors have long relied on cooperator testimony at trials.  Still, concerns about these 
tools for obtaining closely held information have substantially increased in recent years.  
Reliability concerns have loomed largest, but broader social costs have also been 
identified.  After highlighting both the value of informants and cooperators and the 
pathologies associated with them, this chapter explores the external and internal measures 
that can or should be deployed to regulate their use. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
  
There’s nothing new about the police relying on informants to make cases.  Nor is there 
anything new about prosecutors relying on cooperators to prove them.  Such 
informational transactions have come to be a hallmark of the American criminal justice 
system, not just because they are so frequently used but because these morally fraught 
arrangements are largely unregulated by formal law, pose such a risk to investigative and 
adjudicative reliability, and yet hold such a promise of bringing to justice those who 
exercise illegitimate power. 
 
Informants and cooperators have figured prominently in studies, spurred by DNA 
exonerations, of how innocent people get convicted.  The trading of leniency for 
information also undermines the goals of horizontal equity in sentencing and can leave 
dangerous offenders under-punished, even able to commit crimes with impunity.  Yet 
without these arrangements, we’d have to forgo the prosecution of all too many gang, 
mob, corruption, fraud, terrorism, and murder-for-hire cases, as well as the drug 
trafficking cases, big and small, that so often figure in critiques.1  We also might have to 
consider levels of undercover policing and surveillance that we’ve found intolerable or 
prohibitively expensive.  
 
Even	a	well-regulated	system	would	be	hard	pressed	to	ensure that these deals are 
done in the right cases for the right reasons, and that, when done, they are free from the 
dangers of self-dealing by police overeager to make cases, prosecutors looking to post 
convictions at any cost, informants seeking impunity, and cooperators currying favor at 
the expense of truth. The challenge is qualitatively greater in a decentralized criminal 
justice system that, as a matter of formal law, gives plenary discretion to police officers 
and prosecutors to use criminal liability to buy information.  Absent foundational changes 
																																																								
∗
Paul J. Kellner Professor, Columbia Law School.  Thanks to Erik Luna for putting this project together, to 
Susan R. Klein, Daniel S. Medwed, Caren Meyers Morrison, Jessica Roth, and Michael S. Scott for 
extremely helpful comments, and to Kathleen Marini for research assistance. 
1 See DEAN A. DABNEY & RICHARD TEWKSBURY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS AND POLICE INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2016). 
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in the judicial control of enforcement decisionmaking, the path to managing these risks 
thus lies through governance and administrative controls, not adjudication and adversarial 
testing.  To various degrees across diverse jurisdictions, these controls have been 
explored and need to be strengthened.  At the same time, however, we need to embrace 
the reliability and transparency fostered when adversarial and public processes shine a 
light on these arrangements. 
 
II. PREVAILING LAW AND POLICY  
 
The absence of formal legal clarity creates definitional challenges: Is a whistleblower – 
someone with knowledge of, and perhaps some culpability in organizational misconduct, 
and who may be rewarded, even publicly celebrated for reporting it – an “informant”?  
What about the neighbor who tells the police about criminal activities next door?  Both 
may well be condemned as “snitches” (or some other of the many pejorative terms 
reserved for those who breach real or hoped-for solidarity) by the offenders they 
implicate.2  While fuzzy at the edges, however, the terms “informants” and “cooperators” 
are most usefully reserved for those with some personal criminal involvement who avoid 
prosecution or minimize punishment by inculpating others to law enforcement authorities 
in some structured relationship of exchange.  (Even those informants who receive cash 
payments in exchange for information are usually recruited with some informal grant of 
leniency or immunity.3) 
 
That is how I use terms here, with the distinction between the two lying chiefly in the 
stage of the criminal process in which the state uses them.  “Informants” provide 
information, and sometimes operational assistance (like setting up stings), to police 
officers and federal agents pursuing investigations.  “Cooperators,” as cooperating 
defendants are formally called, testify – or more likely, in a world of plea bargaining, are 
prepared to testify – for the prosecution at the trials of charged defendants.  Although 
there is considerable overlap in these categories, with many informants formalizing their 
deals and becoming cooperators, many informants will deal only with the police, and 
many cooperators “sign up” with prosecutors only after they and others have been 
charged.  The formal separation of responsibility between police and prosecutors and the 
lack of a hierarchical relationship between those two institutions in just about all U.S. 
jurisdictions makes the distinction between informants and cooperators less a matter of 
function and more one of institutional management. 
 
																																																								
2 Susan Clampet-Lundquist, Patrick J. Carr & Maria J. Kefalas, The Sliding Scale of Snitching: A 
Qualitative Examination of Snitching in Three Philadelphia Communities, 30 SOC. F. 265 (2015) 
(“Defining ‘snitching’ as it relates to the criminal justice system is complicated, as it can include someone 
caught with an illegal firearm giving police information on someone else, an individual not involved in 
criminal activity testifying as a witness in a trial, or a neighborhood resident calling the police about illegal 
activities on the block.”).  For an insightful exploration of the “social construction of snitches,” see MALIN 
ÅKERSTRÖM, BETRAYAL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF TREACHERY (1990). 
3 There is also a category of informants who are primarily motivated by money — under some federal 
agency guidelines, informants can receive up to 10% (for HSI) or 20% (for DEA) of cash seizures, up to a 
maximum of $100,000 to $250,000 a year. 
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One type of prosecution witness merits its own category and special attention: jailhouse 
informants.  Lacking any prior knowledge or involvement in an offense and, often, any 
certainty of reward (though usually in hope of one), they come forward to the authorities 
claiming to have overheard or otherwise acquired inculpatory evidence about a fellow 
inmate.  A reward will inevitably be forthcoming, in the form of a reduced sentence or 
some other governmental consideration. 
 
One can easily imagine a rigorous regulatory regime – both administrative and judicial – 
governing all governmental relations with informants and cooperators.  Indeed, the 
comparative literature, particularly the work of Jacqueline Ross,4 explores worlds in 
which the principle of legality (the obligation of law enforcers to pursue criminal activity 
that comes to their attention) and longstanding reservations about undercover policing 
and plea bargaining have led to regimes that considerably restrict the legal authority of 
police and prosecutors to trade leniency for information and testimony.  In the United 
States, however, strong legal norms of police and prosecutorial discretion relieve 
enforcers from having to rigorously justify these arrangements to judicial actors, and the 
effective regulatory regime is a mix of bureaucratic controls (of varying clarity and 
stringency) (mostly weak); statutory controls (in some states); trial defenses of  
entrapment or outrageous government misconduct or appeals to juries’ sense of 




In an effort to highlight the special regulatory challenges of informants – as opposed to 
those generally posed whenever human sources of information become the basis for 
police activity – let us focus on those individuals who, faced with the possibility of an 
arrest on related or unrelated criminal charges, agree to provide information to the police 
about the criminal activities of others, and on those who, perhaps acting at the loose or 
tight direction of the police, endeavor, notwithstanding their outsider status, to introduce 
themselves into some ongoing or nascent criminal scheme, usually as a trafficking 
counterparty or some sort of abettor (i.e. purveyor of needed material).  This second 
group will not necessarily be motivated by the desire for leniency – cash rewards may do 
the trick – but it is not likely to include pillars of society.  A great many informants will 
have sustained, structured relationships with one or more police officers or agents. 
 
Informants are not a unique feature of narcotics investigations, but they are particularly 
prevalent in that area.  Decades ago, Malin Åkerström explained why by pointing, first, to 
the nature of drug trafficking: with so many links in a distribution chain, the chances that 
the police will be able to break a link are greater, as is an informant’s confidence that his 
associates won’t immediately recognize his defection.  Åkerström also noted the police 
demand side of the equation: where a type of crime is a high enforcement priority but 
																																																								
4 See Jacqueline E. Ross, Undercover Policing and the Shifting Terms of Scholarly Debate: The United 
States and Europe in Counterpoint, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 239 (2008); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place 
of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 
55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 555 (2007). 
5 See Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 987 (2014). 
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lacks self-identified victims, the pressure to find informants is particularly great.6  Both 
of these explanations remain true today.7  Even so, the “true utility” of informants, as Jon 
Shane notes, stems as much from their ability to infiltrate hard-to-penetrate groups such 
as gangs, organized crime syndicates, criminal tax evasion, money laundering and fraud 
schemes, and “dangerous conspiracies” involving weapons trafficking, human trafficking, 
and terrorism – not just drug conspiracies.8  Moreover, we should expect even more 
reliance on informants, not just to make particular cases but to provide grist for the 
“intelligence-led” policing increasingly touted as the wave of the future.9 
 
The criminal background and self-interested motivations of many informants raise tough 
questions about their reliability and integrity — questions addressed, to some extent, 
through a patchwork of formal legal doctrines.  When, for example, police draw on 
information obtained from an informant to support an application for a search or arrest 
warrant or to justify a warrantless search or arrest, a court will inquire into the 
informant’s reliability (perhaps his “track record” in past cases) and the extent to which 
he is corroborated.10  When an informant helps put in motion the criminal activity for 
which a defendant is later prosecuted, the defendant may be able to get a court to 
scrutinize the government’s tactics by invoking the court’s “supervisory powers” (if the 
jurisdiction allows) or by raising an entrapment defense before the jury.11  The likelihood 
of obtaining relief under either of these approaches is pretty low, however, because courts 
are adverse to using supervisory powers to regulate police operations, and entrapment 
defenses open the door to evidence of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the 
crime.12  Moreover, what is unlikely to receive any judicial scrutiny at all is the 
informant’s role in target selection – the extent to which enforcement discretion has been 
effectively outsourced to him.  The deference courts give to enforcer discretion prevents 
any scrutiny of this de facto power of the informant, with claims of “selective prosecution” 
doomed to fail. 
 
That an informant’s whims or even personal vendettas might lead him to implicate one 
person as opposed to another is a milder form of a more dangerous problem: that an 
informant will use the police to target criminal rivals, so that he can commit his own 
																																																								
6 ÅKERSTRÖM, supra note 2, at 124. 
7 See PETER K. MANNING, THE NARC’S GAME: ORGANIZATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL LIMITS ON DRUG 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 147 (2d ed. 2004). 
8 JON SHANE, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS: A CLOSER LOOK AT POLICE POLICY 3 (2016); see also DABNEY 
& TEWKSBURY, supra note 1, at 66 (finding reliance on informants among homicide, narcotics, prostitution, 
fraud, firearms, robbery, white-collar crime, and burglary investigators). 
9 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Navigating Your Agency’s Path to 
Intelligence-Led Policing (2009); Adrian James, The Advance of Intelligence-Led Policing Strategies: The 
Emperor’s New Clothes? 76 POLICE J. 45 (2003). 
10 Mary Bowman, Full Disclosure: Cognitive Bias, Informants, and Search Warrant Scrutiny, 47 AKRON L. 
REV. 431 (2013). 
11 See Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, supra note 5, at 983; PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
§§ 4.04 (4th ed. 2009). 
12 Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, supra note 5, at 983; MARCUS, supra note 11, at §§ 4.04, 6.02. 
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crimes.13  Whitey Bulger’s achievement of murderous impunity through his relationship 
with FBI agents is a notorious, but sadly not unique, example of this pathology.14 
 
The broader social consequences of a police department or federal agency’s informant 
program, while bound to be significant, will always be difficult to assess.  Some, 
doubtless large, number of investigations wouldn’t go anywhere – particularly when it 
comes to identifying high-level conspirators – without informants.  Moreover, the risk 
that associates are or will inform will destabilize conspiracies and thus reduce the long-
term success of criminal organizations.  On the other hand, because informants can 
substitute for more intensive investigative work, police officers may be tempted to “over 
buy” informant information and overlook more criminal activity by informants than 
necessary.  And any perceived sense of impunity on the part of informants can only 
increase crime.   
 
Of course informants themselves can be victimized by or as a result of their relationship 
with the police.  The individual who faces prosecution because he refused to work with 
the police will at least have some adjudicative safeguards, including a lawyer.  The 
individual who agrees to provide information will frequently not have had the benefit of 
counsel and will, unlike the innocent bystander, find himself at risk of illegitimate and 
unconstrained police exploitation.  More grievous, of course, will be the risk of retaliation, 
not just from those about whom an informant provides information but from those 
worried about being targeted and those simply trying to gain status on the street.15  The 
violence that accompanies criminal fears of betrayal – whether those fears are justified or 
not – is another social cost of informant use.16 
 
The extent that formal doctrine – particularly of the sort that can be invoked in the 
adversary process – constrains how the police use informants turns on whether 
information about police-informant interaction reaches prosecutors.  With different 
priorities, interests, and accountabilities, prosecutors will often have different views on 
																																																								
13 See J. Mitchell Miller, Becoming an Informant, 28 JUST. Q. 203, 214 (2011) (empirical study of 
informants finding: “Inequitable drug deals, reactions to rumors that the target tried to snitch on a friend, 
scorned partners in intimate relationships, and competition elimination are but a few of the more typical 
situations that motivate revenge seeking informants.”). 
14 See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS: THE TRUE STORY OF AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE IRISH MOB (2001); United States v. Flemmi, 195 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247-248 (D. 
Mass. 2001); United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d. 78 (1st Cir. 2000); HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T 
REFORM, EVERYTHING SECRET DEGENERATES: THE FBI'S USE OF MURDERERS AS INFORMANTS, 
3RD REPORT, H.R. REP. NO. 108-414 at 454 (2004), available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
108hrpt414/html/CRPT-108hrpt414-vol1.htm. 
15 Cheryl W. Thompson, Dozens in D.C., Maryland Paid the Ultimate Price for Cooperating with Police, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2015; see also Brendan O’Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, Witness Intimidation, 29 J. LEG. 
STUD. 399 (2010).  
16 See Richard Rosenfeld, Bruce A. Jacobs & Richard Wright, Snitching and the Code of the Street, 43 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 291, 306 (2003) (“snitching is a pervasive element of inner-city street life that posts 
dangers for street criminals and law-abiding residents alike”); MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, DONNA STIENSTRA 




the deals that have been cut and the reliability of the information obtained.17  Prosecutors 
are also the necessary conduit of information to defense counsel and judges.  None of this 
oversight and transmission can occur, however, when police are not candid with 
prosecutors about informant activities, and the absence of such candor risks severe 
miscarriages of justice. 
 
The other, operationally more significant, sources of regulation are, at least potentially, 
bureaucratic controls within agencies, and sometimes political oversight.  What these are 
and the degree to which they address informant pathologies vary greatly across 
jurisdictions.  The U.S. Attorney General’s Guidelines, for example, require that U.S. 
Justice Department agencies conduct suitability inquiries before signing up an informant 
and regular suitability reviews thereafter.  Any illegal activity that informants engage in 
must be authorized and carefully overseen.18  State and local agencies have their own 
guidelines, but often look to the policies and standards of the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the International 




Like an informant, a cooperator may assist in investigations, but, unlike an informant, his 
point of contact is likely to be a prosecutor rather than a cop or agent.  And his status is 
rooted in the adjudicative, not the investigative, stage: His arrangement with the 
government will be in lieu of his own trial and will oblige him to testify against others at 
their trials.  
 
Cooperators, too, are often associated with drug cases, and certainly play important roles 
in federal narcotics prosecutions.  Indeed more than half of the federal defendants 
receiving reduced sentences for “substantial assistance” to the government came from 
drug cases.20  Yet while the feds have the best data collection, drug cases are 
overrepresented in that system.  To be sure, prosecutors from all jurisdictions rely on 
																																																								
17 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
749 (2003). 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS (2002); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE 
OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES (2006), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/ag-
guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf ; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-807, CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS: UPDATES TO POLICY AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD IMPROVE OVERSIGHT BY DOJ AND 
DHS AGENCIES (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0509/final.pdf; OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, AUDIT DIV. 15-28, AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION’S CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE POLICIES AND OVERSIGHT OF HIGHER-RISK CONFIDENTIAL 
SOURCES (2015), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf.  
19 SHANE, supra note 8, at 30. 
20 In fiscal year 2015, of 71,003 cases, 8,470 received substantial assistance departure.  More than half of 
these were drug trafficking cases, with the median percent decrease from the guideline minimum in those 




cooperators in cases involving underground market and sustained organized crime.  But 
cooperating witnesses are a feature in all multi-defendant cases, particularly where there 
are gradations in culpability that facilitate the driving of a wedge into what otherwise 
might be a joint defense.  Indeed, the leading case on the Speedy Trial Clause arose when 
neither the prosecution nor the defense wanted to rush into the trial of one murder 
defendant before they knew the outcome of the multiple trials of a co-defendant who, the 
state hoped, would cooperate if convicted.21 
 
In theory, rather than purchasing testimony with sentencing discounts, prosecutors could 
first convict someone and then procure his testimony through grants of immunity and 
compulsion orders.  The oath alone, however, has its limits when it comes to extracting 
truthful testimony from those deeply involved in criminal conduct.  “Perjury cases are 
rarely brought, hard to prove, and unlikely to add much time to sentences that have 
already been or will be imposed for serious crimes.”22 
 
Cooperator testimony thus must be obtained through explicit (although sometimes 
implicit) negotiation.  Because introducing a cooperator’s inculpatory statements against 
a defendant without giving him a chance to cross-examine the cooperator would violate 
the Confrontation Clause, the cooperator must also be ready to appear at trial.  Should he 
recant or otherwise muddy his testimony, the prosecution’s case will be imperiled.  The 
cooperator’s protection against intimidation or persuasion from the defendant and his 
allies thus becomes a necessary part of prosecutorial planning.  And his agreement will 
usually be structured to delay any sentencing leniency until after he has testified. 
 
Even as prosecutors address one kind of risk from cooperator testimony – the risk that a 
cooperator will defect or otherwise torpedo the trial – they create another one: the risk 
that cooperators seeking to gain maximal leniency via the prosecutor’s recommendation 
will shade their testimony to favor the government, at the expense of the defendant.23 
And there is a parallel risk that even prosecutors trying to restrict cooperators to truthful 
testimony won’t be up to the task.24  
 
Because they have considerable control over how plea deals are structured, prosecutors 
are well-placed to address the risks that cooperators pose to their cases.25  If they attend 
to their truth-promoting duties as well as their adversarial interests, prosecutors can also 
endeavor to ensure that cooperators tell the truth.  But where prosecutors can’t or won’t 
rise to this considerable challenge, the safeguards of reliability come from defense 
counsel’s exposure of a cooperator’s criminal background and self-serving motives26 and 
																																																								
21 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
22 Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from 
Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT. RPTR. 292, 294 (1996). 
23 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995). 
24 See Jessica A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
737, 774-777 (2016); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999). 
25 Richman, Cooperating Clients, supra note 23, at 94-111. 
26 For a reminder that cooperation can reflect remorse and atonement, not simply self-interest, see Michael 
A, Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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from a jury’s ability to properly assess this impeachment material.  Both of these 
safeguards turn on the adequacy of the prosecution’s disclosure of this information 
(including all agreements or informal understandings with the cooperator) – which it is 
constitutionally obliged to turn over27 – and on the adequacy of cross-examination, 
perhaps supported by the trial judge’s cautionary instructions.  While several states have 
gone beyond the federal approach (which relies on cautionary instructions) and have 
required that cooperator testimony be corroborated, those rules “typically require only 
some additional evidence ‘tending’ to connect the defendant to the crime.”28 
 
The social costs of cooperator testimony are not limited to those arising out of these 
reliability risks.  Any sentencing regime committed to horizontal equity, proportionality, 
and to sentences that reflect offense seriousness must worry about the magnitude of the 
discounts that cooperators usually receive for testifying.  To be sure, these costs are off-
set by the enforcement gains brought by the purchase of otherwise unavailable testimony, 
and the instability that the Prisoner’s Dilemma brings to every conspiracy.  Yet the flip 
side of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that the forward-looking conspirator might calculate 
that since, if quick enough, he can avoid his just deserts by informing or cooperating, he 
needn’t worry about – or be deterred by – highly punitive sanctions.29 
 




Given that informants trade in betrayal of their associates and that the enforcement 
projects they assist often involve organizational misconduct whose targeting can itself be 
morally contestable (think Judas and any number of informants used against dissident 
political groups), it’s not surprising that the literature on informants is substantial and 
rich.30  A large body of comparative work reminds us that – however necessary 
informants are to important law enforcement projects – issues of reliability, impunity, and 
corruption inevitably attend their use.31 
 
Yet there are important new analytical strands.  Perhaps because of the increasing scale 
of law enforcement activities and their carceral consequences in the United States, some 
scholars, particularly Alexandra Natapoff, have highlighted how police cultivation of and 
reliance on informants, particularly for narcotics cases, have pathological effects on 
																																																								
27 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
28 Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra note 24, at 760-61. 
29 See Miriam H. Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903 (2011). 
30 See, e.g., Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 
YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (2d 
ed. 1968); GARY MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988); Gary Marx, Thoughts 
on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informer, 80 AM. 
J. SOC. 402 (1974); Peter Reuter, Licensing Criminals: Police and Informants, in ABSCAM ETHICS: 
MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (G.M. Caplan, ed. 1983).  For a useful literature 
review, see DABNEY & TEWKSBURY, supra note 1, at 5-16. 
31 See, e.g., Gustavo Fondevila, Controlling the Madrinas: The Police Informer Management and Control 
System in Mexico, 86 POLICE J. 116 (2013); Colin Dunnighan & Clive Norris, A Risky Business: The 
Recruitment and Running of Informers by English Police Officers, 19 POLICE STUD. 1 (1996). 
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“vulnerable communities.”32  It is in these cases, she notes, where drug arrests and the 
“flipping” of arrestees to inform on their associates are concentrated and where the 
consequent toll on social capital is most marked.  Others have written how the actual or 
perceived concentration of informant activity in inner-city, generally minority, 
communities has given rise to “an exaggerated anti-snitching ‘code of the street’” that 
“weakens informal social control by stigmatizing residents who witness and report 
neighborhood crime, and simultaneously interferes with the system of formal social 
control that is necessary for crime prevention and community safety and justice for 
victims.”33  This “code,” when combined with other sources of distrust of police within 
minority communities, itself contributes to community devastation.  Plunket and 
Lundman, for example, suggested in 2003 that “the significantly lower clearance rates in 
Black census tracts and integrated census tracts are a function of less trust and less 
cooperation and information from citizens.”  They noted, “[w]hen people are reluctant to 
talk to homicide detectives, when they are uneasy about telling homicide detectives what 
they saw, what they know, and what they suspect, the necessary result is lower clearance 
rates.”34 
 
These social costs lead Natapoff and others to argue for data collection and better 
reporting on informant creation and deployment, and, Natapoff hopes, better governance 
of arrangements that lack transparency or accessibility to wholesale, or much retail, legal 
intervention.  Like many others writing before and after her, including Clifford 
Zimmerman,35 Natapoff would tighten up controls over the coercion exerted on potential 
informants and would demand more of the police in assessing reliability.  Even though, 
because of federal visibility and the accessibility of federal guidelines, FBI informant 
guidelines receive considerable attention, Jon Shane has put a spotlight on the best-
practice principles of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and has explored 
the extent to which police department policies around the country are consistent with 
them.36 
 
Some recent calls for increased regulation of police-informant relationships come from 
those concerned as much for the plight of the informants themselves as for those on 
whom they inform and the communities in which they live.  Michael Rich, in particular, 
has gone so far as to suggest a Thirteenth Amendment basis for regulating informant 
																																																								
32 ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 5 
(2009); see also Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, A Multilevel Study of 
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997). 
33 Rachael A. Woldoff & Karen G. Weiss, Stop Snitchin’: Exploring Definitions of The Snitch and 
Implications for Urban Black Communities, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 184 (2010) 
http://www.albany.edu/scj/jcjpc/vol17is1/Woldoff7_6.pdf.  
34 Janice L. Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis 
of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 185 (2003); see also Susan 
Clampet-Lundquist, Patrick J. Carr & Maria J. Kefalas, supra note 2; Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, 
Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer Trends in American Murders, __ COLUM. L. REV. __ (2017) 
(forthcoming) (highlighting connection between low clearance rates and homicide spikes in certain cities). 
35 Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for 
Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1994). 
36 SHANE, supra note 8.   
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relationships and would demand, among other things, a far higher degree of counsel 




Because jailhouse informants usually have only passing knowledge of the defendants 
against whom their testimony is sought; because this thin interaction is often motivated 
by powerful self-interest, and because, not coincidentally, jailhouse informants have 
figured prominently in the conviction of a number of defendants who have thereafter 
been exonerated, this distinct category of witnesses has appropriately received special 
attention in the literature.  Some, like Rory Little and Russell Covey, have cogently 




Discussion of cooperators in the scholarly literature often overlaps with that of plea 
bargaining generally – for cooperation agreements are indeed a variant, albeit a 
distinctive variant, of plea agreements.39  Moreover, it is true that prosecutorial power – 
the target of most plea bargaining critiques – gets supercharged when legislators create 
mandatory minimums or mandatory guidelines over which prosecutors, and not judges, 
have control.  But the effects of these sentencing measures are often exaggerated by those 
who forget the extent to which judges, even when endowed with considerable sentencing 
discretion, would defer to prosecutorial leniency recommendations for defendants whose 
offenses would otherwise have led to maximal punishment.  Cooperating witnesses are 
seeking deep discounts for their testimony and have generally received them, under any 
number of sentencing regimes. 
 
If useful and reliable testimony is to come from such self-interested witnesses, a variety 
of actors must be capable of extraordinary discernment.  Prosecutors, in particular, have 
to be able to figure out when a cooperator is fabricating or shading testimony to curry 
favor with the government, protect others, or advance some hidden personal agenda.  
They also, as Miriam Baer has noted, need to be able to discern whether they are making 
a deal with the right person and whether overall enforcement goals are served by a deal.40  
A growing literature has expressed skepticism that prosecutors have this capacity.41  
Others have focused on the capacity of juries – in the relatively small number of cases 
																																																								
37 Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on the Police-Informant 
Relationship, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681 (2010); see also Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, 
Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1977); see also David 
Katz, The Paradoxical Role of Informers Within the Criminal Justice System: A Unique Perspective, 7 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 51, 68 n.104 (1981) (making a similar argument).  
38 Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1375 (2014); Rory 
K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence 
in Capital Statutes, 37 SW. L. REV. 965, 968–69 (2008). 
39 Richman, Cooperating Clients, supra note 23 (suggesting that while plea agreements are generally 
executory contracts, cooperation agreements are more like relational contracts). 
40 See Baer, supra note 29, at 917.  
41  See Yaroshefsky, supra note 24; Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra 
note 24 at 774-77. 
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that go to trial – to assess cooperator credibility.42  If they are going to properly assess 
testimony, juries, of course, need to know the full contours of deals with prosecutors, and 
scholars like Michael Cassidy have drawn attention to inadequate disclosure practices in 
this regard.43 
 
Given the reliability concerns, effects on sentencing equity, and public costs of giving 
deep sentencing discounts to cooperators, some like Ian Weinstein and Caren Morrison 
have called for more scrutiny of deals within prosecutors’ offices and greater 
transparency of those arrangements for the general public.44  Jessica Roth has called for 
an exploration of the optimal incentives in cooperation agreements and the optimal 
policies for handling cooperator trial preparation and testimony.45  At the same time, it’s 




The basic structure of the deal in which a corporate insider implicated in criminal 
misconduct commits to testifying against others within the firm or the firm itself is little 
different from the deal in which one gangster agrees to testify against racketeering 
associates.  Yet the corporate context of these arrangements, and the readiness of firms, 
for their part, to cooperate against their employees in order to obtain leniency has 
appropriately given rise to its own special literature.  Because the corporate version of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma – in which corporate executives, lower-level employees, and the firm 
itself will regularly jockey to influence the government’s understanding of the nature and 
causes of corporate misconduct and its ensuing charging decision – has been identified as 
a source of inequities and ineffectiveness in the government’s pursuit of such misconduct, 
this cooperation literature overlaps with critiques of white collar enforcement policy, 
particularly in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis.47 
																																																								
42 See Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury 
Decision Making, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 137 (2008) (experimental evidence suggests that information 
about cooperative witness’ incentive did not affect participants’ verdict decisions); see also JEFFREY S. 
NEUSCHATZ ET AL., UNRELIABLE INFORMANT TESTIMONY, IN CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS 
FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Brian L. Cutler. Ed. 2012). 
43 R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied 
Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2004). 
44 Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 593 (1999); Caren Meyers 
Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet 
Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921 (2009). 
45 Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra note 24, at 789, 795. 
46 See Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-506 (2016), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757811; SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE 
GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE LAW? 138 (2013); Will Connors & Luciana 
Magalhaes, How Brazil’s “Nine Horsemen” Cracked a Bribery Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2015; see 
also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Brazil, 40-41 (Oct. 2014). 
47 See Daniel Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 (2014); Baer, supra note 
29; Brandon Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789 (2015); William S. 
Laufer, Corporate Prosecution Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643 (2002); 
Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate Citizenship,” 76 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 979 (2002); Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT  
 
Informants and cooperators will continue to be key components of all non-patrol-based 
law enforcement projects – at least to the extent these projects are pursued through arrest 
and prosecution.48  Indeed, calls for better-targeted enforcement strategies and concerns 
about broad surveillance programs will only increase reliance on bad guys with critical 
inside information about the misconduct of others.  The conversation about trade-offs 
between surveillance and “humint” (human intelligence) that is a standard trope in the 
intelligence business must be a part of criminal enforcement policy as well.49  Moreover, 
growing limitations on law enforcement’s ability to obtain personal communications and 
data via warrant will make informants even more valuable.50 
  
“There is a cold brutality and inherent risk of unreliability in the way we use the threat of 
vastly greater prison time to squeeze information out of culpable defendants.  But no 
equally effective tool for prying closely held information about corrupt dealings or other, 
less genteel forms of organized crime has been devised.”51  Even in the terrorism area – 
where any number of alternatives to criminal justice treatment have been explored – 
experts have come to appreciate the intelligence value of the “normal” coercive power of 
criminal sanctions.52  In a criminal justice system like ours that has few clear priors on 
how police officers and prosecutors extract information from criminals through grants of 
leniency, it is unavoidable that one’s views on whether such deals are moral or 
proportionate will have much to do with one’s sense of the stakes, circumstances, and 
alternatives. 
 
At a bare minimum, the use of informants should not be allowed to obstruct the accuracy 
and procedural fairness commitments of the adjudicatory system.  Prosecutors must 
receive accurate and complete information about informants and their use from the police, 
so that prosecutors can adequately engage in their gatekeeping functions and attend to 
their disclosure obligations.  Prosecutors must, in turn, ensure that defense counsel 
																																																																																																																																																																					
(2007); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 311 (2007); Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’ 
Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2006).	
48 The growing literature on problem-oriented policing and situational crime prevention counsels more 
attention to the costs of standard penal responses.  For a sketch of the costs associated with sting operations, 
see Graeme R. Newman, Sting Operations, 29-33 (2007) (part of DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE), available at 
http://www.popcenter.org/responses/sting_operations/.  
49 See GARY MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, supra note 30; Dru Stevenson, 
Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2008). 
50 See REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC 
SAFETY (Nov. 2016), available at 
http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/11.18.15%20Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%20an
d%20Public%20Safety.pdf.  
51 Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67-68 (2013).   
52 See David. S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT. SEC. L & POL’Y 1, 60-61 
(2011). 
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receive the material they are legally entitled to in order to litigate defects in informant 
handling and reliability.  Even so, much of the interaction between police officers and 
informants won’t get aired in any adjudication process,53 and other institutions are needed 
to address the risk of self-dealing endemic to informant arrangements. 
 
A number of “agency costs” need to be addressed: Informants seeking impunity at the 
least personal cost will have reason to minimize their own culpability, maximize that of 
those they don’t mind giving up to the police, and cut corners in information-gathering.  
Police officers will overlook informant misconduct, unreliability and targeting 
pathologies so as to make the next big case, or perhaps just a lot of little ones.  Police 
agency costs can occur at the institutional as well as the individual level, with 
departmental priorities inappropriately skewed to case-types in which informant 
information substitutes for expensive investigative work. 
 
In theory, regulation of informant arrangements can be done by statute, and occasionally 
this has occurred.  In the wake of a well-covered case in which an informant was killed 
during a sting operation, Florida enacted “Rachel’s Law,” establishing new guidelines for 
the police when dealing with informants.54  Because lawmakers either doubt their 
competence to seriously regulate in this area or are averse to limiting police options, 
however, statutory regulation is rare.  Even in Florida, one of the most significant 
proposed reforms – requiring that informants have the assistance of counsel before 
entering into any deal – was stripped out of Rachel’s Law before its enactment.55 
 
Internal regulation is thus the primary means of structuring and monitoring police-
informant relationships.  The Justice Department guidelines are the most conspicuous 
example of such regulation, and provide the basis for audits of agency practices.56  
Outside the federal government, however, the decentralization of most law enforcement 
authority has made regulation more varied and episodic.  Even in New Jersey, where the 
constitutional structure allows for more regulation than usual, there remains no mandated 
statewide police rules for recruiting, cultivating and using informants.57  The regulatory 
																																																								
53 While showing the reliability benefits of recording conversations between informants and the police, 
Robert Mosteller notes the operational impediments to doing so. Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of 
Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and 
Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 566 (2009). 
54 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 914.28 (2016). 
55 Note, Ian Leson, Toward Efficiency and Equity in Law Enforcement: “Rachel’s Law” and the Protection 
of Drug Informants, 32 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 391 (2012); NATAPOFF, supra note 32, at 183. 
56 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES (2005), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0509/final.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, AUDIT 
DIV. 15-28, AUDIT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE POLICIES AND 
OVERSIGHT OF HIGHER-RISK CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (2015); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-15-807, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS: UPDATES TO POLICY AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE 
WOULD IMPROVE OVERSIGHT BY DOJ AND DHS AGENCIES (2015), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf.  
57 Delores Jones-Brown & Jon M. Shane, An Exploratory Study of the Use of Confidential Informants in 
New Jersey 1 (2011) (ACLU commissioned report), available at https://www.aclu-
nj.org/files/1113/1540/4573/0611ACLUCIReportBW.pdf.  
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action, if it is going to come, will therefore be at the city and county level, and certainly 
ought to be encouraged.58  The heterogeneity of police departments and their oversight 
mechanisms across the country precludes blind trust in internal regulatory mechanisms.  
But I’m not persuaded that this diminishes the promise of, and need for, pushing in this 
direction. 
 
To some extent, the Confrontation Clause’s demand that the witnesses against a 
defendant come into court and testify in person against him offers safeguards in the way 
of transparency and cross-examination that counsel less regulation of cooperators and 
even testifying jailhouse informants than may be needed for informants.  For this to work, 
prosecutors must comply with their constitutional and statutory obligations to give 
defense counsel adequate information about the nature of the witness’s deal.  However 
clear the law is on these obligations, more training, enforcement, and sanctions are 
needed, because violations occur all too frequently.59  There are some close issues, 
however.  Those who would have every aspect of a cooperator’s interaction with 
prosecutors recorded need, for instance, to consider whether judges should step in when 
defense counsel turns her license to use prior inconsistent statements into a clock-running 
exercise.60 
 
Even heightened adversarial safeguards may not be good enough to justify the use of 
jailhouse informant witnesses.  Russell Covey has argued:  
 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is an inherently unreliable type of evidence.  Snitches 
have powerful incentives to invent incriminating lies about other inmates in often 
well-founded hopes that such testimony will provide them with material benefits, 
including in many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges or sentences.  
At the same time, false snitch testimony is difficult if not altogether impossible to 
impeach.  Because such testimony usually pits the word of two individuals against 
one another, both of whose credibility is suspect, jurors have little ability to 
accurately or effectively assess or weigh the evidence.61 
 
Although it is far from clear that this reasoning makes jailhouse informant testimony 
qualitatively different from cooperator testimony more generally, experience may justify 
this line-drawing and argue for categorical exclusion.  Certainly, every prosecutor’s 
office should think long and hard, and draw on the judgments of those outside the trial 
team, before putting a jailhouse informant on the stand.  Daniel Medwed has cogently set 
out how – in the wake of the explosive revelation in 1988 of the systematic fabrication of 
testimony by inmates of the county jail – the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office has 
																																																								
58 For a recent local audit, see NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR THE NYPD, AN INVESTIGATION OF NYPD’S COMPLIANCE WITH RULES GOVERNING 
INVESTIGATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY (2016), available at 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/oig_intel_report_823_final_for_release.pdf.  
59 Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra note 24, at 785. 
60 See Daniel Richman, Framing the Prosecution, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 684-85 (2014). 
61 Covey, supra note 38 at 1428; see Little, supra note 38. 
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developed an elaborate protocol for scrutinizing these potential witnesses.62  It is 
tempting to advocate for banning these witnesses entirely, but one can imagine situations 
where a jailhouse witness’s testimony is not only critical for proving a matter of grave 
consequence but comes with extraordinary circumstantial indicia of reliability. 
 
A softer regulatory intervention could include turning judges into gatekeepers, requiring 
them to hold reliability hearings before allowing any cooperator testimony.  Jessica Roth 
has touted the benefits of such hearings: 
 
First, they would provide an external check on prosecutorial decisions regarding 
informant witnesses.  Although not all cases involving informants would proceed 
to that stage, the possibility of such hearings would operate as a powerful 
incentive to prosecutors and agents to think more carefully about their choice of 
informants, since it is not always possible to tell ex ante which case will result in 
a reliability hearing.  Hearings would pry open the “black box” of informant use, 
to a far greater extent than does current practice, providing greater accountability 
for prosecutorial use of informants.  Second, reliability hearings would provide 
courts with the opportunity to develop a common law regarding the factors and 
practices associated with greater informant reliability.63 
 
While, if we are not going to categorically exclude jailhouse informant testimony, it 
makes sense to have searching reliability hearings for it, I’m not persuaded that we 
should use this judicial gatekeeping for all cooperating witnesses.  It seems churlish, 
particularly in the wake of DNA exonerations, to question anything that promotes 
reliability, but this particular mechanism is troublingly asymmetrical, having the effect of 
keeping only key prosecution evidence out and to do so in many sorts of cases 
(corruption, organized crime, corporate fraud, police abuses) that, to my mind, go 
underprosecuted.  However much we might, as a matter of theory, welcome thoughtful 
judicial interventions that avoid false negatives as well as false positives and leave 
adequate room for jury assessments, I would like to know more about the likelihood, as 
an institutional matter, that trial judges – in all their state and federal variation64 – would 
strike the right balance.  In any event, any reliability gain would be limited by the plea 
bargaining that makes trials the exception to the general rule. 
 
Given the institutional capacity – though not always the inclination – of prosecutors’ 
offices, I think it far preferable for rigorous testing of cooperator reliability and serious 
deliberation about the need to “purchase” testimony with leniency to occur within those 
offices (and not be limited to the trial team), rather than in courtrooms.  Interventions that 
force officials to step up to their responsibilities, like Caren Morrison’s suggestion for 
																																																								
62 DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
INNOCENT, 90-91 (2013). 
63 Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra note 24, at 786; see also George 
C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000); 
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 CRIM. LAW 
& CRIMINOLOGY 329, 364 (2012). 
64 See Claire S.H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence 
from State Trial Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360 (2013). 
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more public disclosure of cooperator deals,65 Ellen Yaroshefsky’s call for better 
training,66 and Jessica Roth’s call for more reliability-focused experimentation67 are 
therefore the most promising. 
 
Even as we tinker with the conditions under which information is obtained from bad guys 
and the measures by which our adjudicative system and political structures come to grips 
with those conditions, we should also try to reach out more to non-criminal sources of 
information.  Resources for protecting witnesses need to be increased, and efforts to 
intimidate must be punished severely.  But unless a police force can win the trust of its 




1.   Although it is surely common knowledge across police departments and federal 
enforcement agencies that care must be taken to assess the reliability of, to monitor, and 
to protect informants, the clarity of informant guidelines varies substantially across 
departments, as does the training that officers and agents actually receive and the 
measures taken to ensure compliance.  Any deficiencies with respect to both guidelines 
and training should be attended to, with some sort of oversight by an entity insulated 
from the pressure to make cases.  So should deficiencies in the funding for witness 
protection, particularly in local jurisdictions. 
 
2.   Departments and Agencies should give far more consideration to the social costs of 
using informants and the alternatives.  Informants will inevitably be key investigative 
tools, but in the aggregate, their use can erode the social capital within crime-plagued 
communities.  Protocols should be established to ensure that they are not overused.  
Moreover, their use should not be allowed to substitute for police efforts to develop 
bonds with law-abiding members of the communities they serve.  Developing those 
bonds will require consideration of the impact of police tactics on those communities. 
 
3.  Every jurisdiction should look closely at how it uses jailhouse informants, and should 
demand better justification of their use from prosecutors, both at the wholesale level and 
case by case.  Judicial gatekeeping may provide a satisfactory compromise, but rigorous 
testing of reliability is essential.  
 
4.  Prosecutors should be trained to scrutinize the reliability of possible cooperators, and 
each office should have protocols to ensure that deals are made with cooperators only 
																																																								
65 Morrison, supra note 44. 
66 Yaroshefsky, supra note 24, at 964. 
67 Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, supra note 24, at 786-90. 
68 On need for more focused information gathering in homicide investigations, see Fagan & Richman, 
supra note 34; JILL LOEVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015); Benjamin 
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when necessary.  Committees that allow senior prosecutors outside the trial team to 
assess reliability and need should be established whenever possible. 
 
5.  Prosecutors must take care to comply with their discovery and disclosure obligations 
as to the nature of their deals with cooperators to ensure that cooperator reliability can be 
tested via cross-examination and explored by jurors.  To the extent possible – with due 
attention to the enormous personal risks that cooperators often take – information about 
such deals, both in individual cases and in the aggregate should be disclosed to the public, 
to ensure that interested citizens can get a better sense of both the costs and benefits of 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
